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INNOVATION AND COMPETITION POLICY:
CASES AND MATERIALS
Herbert Hovenkamp
CHAPTER 3
HARM TO COMPETITION OR INNOVATION (2D ED);
REMEDIES
BRUNSWICK CORP. v. PUEBLO BOWL-O-MAT, INC.
429 U.S. 477 (1977)
Mr. Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case raises important questions concerning the interrelationship of
the antimerger and private damages action provisions of the Clayton
Antitrust Act.
Petitioner is one of the two largest manufacturers of bowling equipment
in the United States. Respondents are three of the 10 bowling centers owned
by Treadway Companies, Inc. Since 1965, petitioner has acquired and
operated a large number of bowling centers, including six in the markets in
which respondents operate. Respondents instituted this action contending
that these acquisitions violated various provisions of the antitrust laws. In
the late 1950's, the bowling industry expanded rapidly, and petitioner's sales
of lanes, automatic pinsetters, and ancillary equipment rose accordingly.
Since this equipment requires a major capital expenditure $12,600 for each
lane and pinsetter, most of petitioner's sales were for secured credit.
In the early 1960's, the bowling industry went into a sharp decline.
Petitioner's sales quickly dropped to preboom levels. Moreover, petitioner
experienced great difficulty in collecting money owed it; by the end of 1964
over $100,000,000, or more than 25%, of petitioner's accounts were more
than 90 days delinquent. Repossessions rose dramatically, but attempts to
sell or lease the repossessed equipment met with only limited success.
Because petitioner had borrowed close to $250,000,000 to finance its credit
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sales, it was, as the Court of Appeals concluded, “in serious financial
difficulty.”
To meet this difficulty, petitioner began acquiring and operating
defaulting bowling centers when their equipment could not be resold and a
positive cash flow could be expected from operating the centers. During the
seven years preceding the trial in this case, petitioner acquired 222 centers,
54 of which it either disposed of or closed. These acquisitions made
petitioner by far the largest operator of bowling centers, with over five
times as many centers as its next largest competitor. Petitioner's net worth
in 1965 was more than eight times greater, and its gross revenue more than
seven times greater, than the total for the 11 next largest bowling chains.
Nevertheless, petitioner controlled only 2% of the bowling centers in the
United States.
At issue here are acquisitions by petitioner in the three markets in which
respondents are located: Pueblo, Colo., Poughkeepsie, N. Y., and Paramus,
N. J. In 1965, petitioner acquired one defaulting center in Pueblo, one in
Poughkeepsie, and two in the Paramus area. In 1969, petitioner acquired a
third defaulting center in the Paramus market, and in 1970 petitioner
acquired a fourth. Petitioner closed its Poughkeepsie center in 1969 after
three years of unsuccessful operation; the Paramus center acquired in 1970
also proved unsuccessful, and in March 1973 petitioner gave notice that it
would cease operating the center when its lease expired. The other four
centers were operational at the time of trial.
Respondents initiated this action in June 1966, alleging, inter alia, that
these acquisitions might substantially lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly in violation of § 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §18.
Respondents sought damages, pursuant to s 4 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15, for
three times “the reasonably expectable profits to be made (by respondents)
from the operation of their bowling centers.” App. A24. Respondents also
sought a divestiture order, an injunction against future acquisitions, and
such “other further and different relief” as might be appropriate under s 16
of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26.
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The Court of Appeals, while endorsing the legal theories upon which
respondents' claim was based, reversed the judgment and remanded the case
for further proceedings. The court found that a properly instructed jury
could have concluded that petitioner was a “giant” whose entry into a
“market of pygmies” might lessen horizontal retail competition, because
such a “giant” “has greater ease of entry into the market, can accomplish
cost-savings by investing in new equipment, can resort to low or below cost
sales to sustain itself against competition for a longer period, and can obtain
more favorable credit terms.”
The court also found that there was sufficient evidence to permit a jury
to conclude that but for petitioner's actions, the acquired centers would have
gone out of businessAnd the court held that if a jury were to make such
findings, respondents would be entitled to damages for threefold the income
they would have earned. After reviewing the instructions on these issues,
however, the court decided that the jury had not been properly charged and
that therefore a new trial was required. It also decided that since “an
essential predicate” for the District Court's grant of equitable relief was the
jury verdict on the s 7 claim, the equitable decree should be vacated as well.
And it concluded that in any event equitable relief “should be restricted to
preventing those practices by which a deep pocket market entrant harms
competition. . . . (D)ivestiture was simply inappropriate.”
The issue for decision is a narrow one. Petitioner does not presently
contest the Court of Appeals' conclusion that a properly instructed jury
could have found the acquisitions unlawful. Nor does petitioner challenge
the Court of Appeals' determination that the evidence would support a
finding that had petitioner not acquired these centers, they would have gone
out of business and respondents' income would have increased. Petitioner
questions only whether antitrust damages are available where the sole injury
alleged is that competitors were continued in business, thereby denying
respondents an anticipated increase in market shares.
To answer that question it is necessary to examine the antimerger and
treble-damages provisions of the Clayton Act. Section 7 of the Act
proscribes mergers whose effect “may be substantially to lessen
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competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.” (Emphasis added.) It is, as
we have observed many times, a prophylactic measure, intended “primarily
to arrest apprehended consequences of intercorporate relationships before
those relationships could work their evil . . . .”
Section 4, in contrast, is in essence a remedial provision. It provides
treble damages to “(a)ny person who shall be injured in his business or
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws . . . .” Of
course, treble damages also play an important role in penalizing wrongdoers
and deterring wrongdoing, as we also have frequently observed. It
nevertheless is true that the treble-damages provision, which makes awards
available only to injured parties, and measures the awards by a multiple of
the injury actually proved, is designed primarily as a remedy.
Intermeshing a statutory prohibition against acts that have a potential to
cause certain harms with a damages action intended to remedy those harms
is not without difficulty. Plainly, to recover damages respondents must
prove more than that petitioner violated §7, since such proof establishes
only that injury may result. Respondents contend that the only additional
element they need demonstrate is that they are in a worse position than they
would have been had petitioner not committed those acts. The Court of
Appeals agreed, holding compensable any loss “causally linked” to “the
mere presence of the violator in the market.” Because this holding divorces
antitrust recovery from the purposes of the antitrust laws without a clear
statutory command to do so, we cannot agree with it.
Every merger of two existing entities into one, whether lawful or
unlawful, has the potential for producing economic readjustments that
adversely affect some persons. But Congress has not condemned mergers
on that account; it has condemned them only when they may produce
anticompetitive effects. Yet under the Court of Appeals' holding, once a
merger is found to violate §7, all dislocations caused by the merger are
actionable, regardless of whether those dislocations have anything to do
with the reason the merger was condemned. This holding would make s 4
recovery entirely fortuitous, and would authorize damages for losses which
are of no concern to the antitrust laws.
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Both of these consequences are well illustrated by the facts of this case.
If the acquisitions here were unlawful, it is because they brought a “deep
pocket” parent into a market of “pygmies.” Yet respondents' injury the loss
of income that would have accrued had the acquired centers gone bankrupt
bears no relationship to the size of either the acquiring company or its
competitors. Respondents would have suffered the identical “loss” but no
compensable injury had the acquired centers instead obtained refinancing or
been purchased by “shallow pocket” parents as the Court of Appeals itself
acknowledged, Thus, respondents' injury was not of “the type that the
statute was intended to forestall.”…
But the antitrust laws are not merely indifferent to the injury claimed
here. At base, respondents complain that by acquiring the failing centers
petitioner preserved competition, thereby depriving respondents of the
benefits of increased concentration. The damages respondents obtained are
designed to provide them with the profits they would have realized had
competition been reduced. The antitrust laws, however, were enacted for
“the protection of competition not competitors,” Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S., at 320. It is inimical to the purposes of these laws to award
damages for the type of injury claimed here.
Of course, Congress is free, if it desires, to mandate damages awards for
all dislocations caused by unlawful mergers despite the peculiar
consequences of so doing. But because of these consequences, “we should
insist upon a clear expression of a congressional purpose,” before
attributing such an intent to Congress. We can find no such expression in
either the language or the legislative history of §4. To the contrary, it is far
from clear that the loss of windfall profits that would have accrued had the
acquired centers failed even constitutes “injury” within the meaning of § 4.
And it is quite clear that if respondents were injured, it was not “by reason
of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws”: while respondents' loss
occurred “by reason of” the unlawful acquisitions, it did not occur “by
reason of” that which made the acquisitions unlawful.
We therefore hold that the plaintiffs to recover treble damages on
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account of § 7 violations, they must prove more than injury causally linked
to an illegal presence in the market. Plaintiffs must prove antitrust injury,
which is to say injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent
and that flows from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful. The injury
should reflect the anticompetitive effect either of the violation or of
anticompetitive acts made possible by the violation. It should, in short, be
“the type of loss that the claimed violations . . . would be likely to cause.”
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, 395 U.S., at 125.
We come, then, to the question of appropriate disposition of this case.
At the very least, petitioner is entitled to a new trial, not only because of the
instructional errors noted by the Court of Appeals that are not at issue here,
see n. 6, supra, but also because the District Court's instruction as to the
basis for damages was inconsistent with our holding as outlined above. Our
review of the record, however, persuades us that a new trial on the damages
claim is unwarranted. Respondents based their case solely on their novel
damages theory which we have rejected. While they produced some
conclusory testimony suggesting that in operating the acquired centers
petitioner had abused its deep pocket by engaging in anticompetitive
conduct, they made no attempt to prove that they had lost any income as a
result of such predation. Rather, their entire proof of damages was based on
their claim to profits that would have been earned had the acquired centers
closed. Since respondents did not prove any cognizable damages and have
not offered any justification for allowing respondents, after two trials and
over 10 years of litigation, yet a third opportunity to do so, it follows that,
petitioner is entitled, in accord with its motion made pursuant to Rule 50(b),
to judgment on the damages claim notwithstanding the verdict.
NOTES AND QUESTIONS
1. The “antitrust injury” doctrine developed in Brunswick is not about
causation or injury in fact. Clearly the merger that the plaintiff was
challenging caused it to suffer harm. The problem was the kind of harm.
The plaintiff was complaining about more competition rather than less, and
it would be inimicable to the purpose of antitrust law to use it to restrain
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rather than promote competition. Nevertheless, several courts have read
Brunswick to require little more than harm and causation.
2. One great value of the antitrust injury requirement is that it enables
courts to assess complaints without discovery, simply by looking at the
theory of injury. For example, just by looking at the plaintiff’s complaint in
Brunswick one can ascertain that the complaint is about increased
competition rather than less.
3. In Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986), the
Supreme Court held that the antitrust injury doctrine also applied to requests
for an injunction. The lower courts had enjoined the merger of two
competitors on the usual ground that it increased concentration and thus
made future oligopoly pricing more likely. The Supreme Court ruled that
the plaintiff, a competitor, was not entitled to the injunction based on its
complaint that after the merger the firm would charge lower but
nonpredatory prices. Mergers are ordinarily condemned when the fear is
higher prices. Comparing §4 of the Clayton Act, which authorizes
damages, and §16, which authorizes injunctions at the behest of private
plaintiffs, the Court said:
The wording concerning the relationship of the injury to the
violation of the antitrust laws in each section is comparable. Section 4
requires proof of injury “by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust
laws”; §16 requires proof of “threatened loss or damage by a violation
of the antitrust laws.” It would be anomalous, we think, to read the
Clayton Act to authorize a private plaintiff to secure an injunction
against a threatened injury for which he would not be entitled to
compensation if the injury actually occurred.
ANDREAS V. VOLKSWAGEN OF AMERICA, INC.
336 F.3d 789 (8th Cir. 2003)
HANSEN, Circuit Judge.
Brian Andreas, an artist and author from Decorah, Iowa, created a
drawing in 1994 entitled “Angels of Mercy,” which he paired with the
accompanying text he authored: “Most people don't know that there are
angels whose only job is to make sure you don't get too comfortable & fall
asleep & miss your life.” The work was copyrighted and copies of it were
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included in numerous books. Prints of the work have been sold throughout
the United States.
M & S created three television commercials to promote Audi's initial
release of the Audi TT coupe into the United States market. One of the
television commercials, referred to as the “Wake Up” commercial, depicted
an Audi TT coupe in a garden surrounded by angelic looking, neoclassical
statues. The commercial contained a voice-over, which says in its entirety:
“I think I just had a wake-up call, and it was disguised as a car, and it was
screaming at me not to get too comfortable and fall asleep and miss my
life.” The commercial aired from May through October 1999, when Audi
pulled the commercial after the allegation of copyright infringement were
brought to its attention.
Andreas brought a copyright infringement action against M & S and
Audi….
The district court granted Audi's motion for JAML and vacated the jury's
$570,000 award representing Audi's profits generated by the
illegal copyright infringement. The court found that the award was too
speculative because Andreas failed to prove a causal connection between
the infringement and Audi's profits from the TT coupe. The award equaled
10% of Audi's after-tax profits on the TT coupe sales during the time the
commercial aired. …
The Copyright Act provides that a copyright holder is entitled to recover
his actual damages as well as “any profits of the infringer that are
attributable to the infringement and are not taken into account in computing
actual damages.” 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2000). The infringer's profits are
awarded to the copyright holder “to prevent the infringer from unfairly
benefiting from a wrongful act.” “In establishing the infringer's profits, the
copyright owner is required to present proof only of the infringer's gross
revenue, and the infringer is required to prove his or her deductible
expenses and the elements of profit attributable to factors other than the
copyrighted work.” § 504(b). “[W]here some of the defendant's profits
result from the infringement and other profits are caused by different
factors, ... the burden of proof is on the defendant ... [to] prove not only ‘his
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or her deductible expenses' but also ‘the element of the profit attributable to
factors other than the copyrighted work.’ ” H.R.Rep. No. 94–1476, § 504, at
161 (quoting § 504(b)). “Any doubt as to the computation of costs or profits
is to be resolved in favor of the plaintiff….
Audi does not dispute the jury's finding of copyright infringement, but
argues only that Andreas failed to establish a causal connection between the
infringement and its gross revenues from the sale of the TT coupe. The
district court noted that generally “a rebuttable presumption that the
defendant's revenues are entirely attributable to the infringement arises, and
the burden then shifts to the defendant to demonstrate what portion of the
profits are not traceable to the infringement.” The court applied a less strict
standard, however, because this case involves indirect profits as opposed to
direct profits: the infringers did not sell the copyrighted work, but used the
copyrighted work to sell another product, the TT coupe. The court found
that Andreas's proffered evidence of a connection between the infringement
and Audi's revenues from the sale of the TT coupe during the time the
commercial aired was too speculative to support the jury's award.
Although cases distinguish between direct and indirect profits, the statute
does not…. We agree that in an indirect profits case the profits
“attributable” to the infringement are more difficult to quantify. But that
difficulty does not change the burden of proof established by the statute….
The burden of proving apportionment (i.e., the contribution to profits of
elements other than the infringed property), is the defendant's.
The district court here concluded that the uncertainties in the evidence
went to whether Audi profited from the infringing commercial at all—for
which Andreas carried the burden of proof-rather than the extent that it
profited from the infringement—for which Audi carried the burden of
proof—because Andreas failed to prove that the infringed words resulted in
the sale of any TT coupe. (Order at 9 (“While most people believe that
advertising contributes somehow to the sales of motor vehicles, it is not
sufficient for a plaintiff to rely on such intuitive notions as proof of
causation.”).) However, in ruling on a motion for JAML, the evidence is to
be read to support the verdict if at all reasonable. Andreas introduced more
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than mere speculation that the Wake Up commercial contributed to sales of
the TT coupe. The infringement was the centerpiece of a commercial that
essentially showed nothing but the TT coupe. The evidence established that
Audi enthusiastically presented the commercial to its dealers as an
important and integral part of its launch of the TT coupe into the U.S.
market; sales of the TT coupe during the period that the commercial aired
were above Audi's projections; the three commercials received high ratings
on the Allison–Fischer surveys that rated consumer recall of the
commercials; and Audi paid M & S a substantial bonus based on the
success of the commercials. Reading this evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict, the commercial did more than merely “contribute[ ]
somehow,” id., to sales of the TT coupe.
Audi argues that numerous unknown elements other than the
commercial, let alone the infringing words contained in the commercial,
contributed to sales of the TT coupe, and that therefore the award was based
on speculation. We recognize that the offending commercial probably did
not contribute to every purchase of a TT coupe during the relevant time
period. Undoubtedly, some buyer somewhere bought a TT coupe without
having seen the commercial despite Audi's extensive use of it. But we reject
the notion that Andreas was required to put a TT buyer on the stand to
testify that she bought the car because of the commercial in order to meet
his burden of a causal connection. Once a nexus was shown as established
above, Andreas was required under the statute only to establish Audi's gross
revenue from the TT coupe. Audi then bore the burden of establishing that
its profit was attributable to factors other than the infringing words: the
other two commercials that did not contain the infringed words, other parts
of the Wake Up commercial, customer loyalty, brand recognition, etc. “Any
doubt as to the computation of costs or profits is to be resolved in favor of
the plaintiff. If the infringing defendant does not meet its burden of proving
costs, the gross figure stands as the defendant's profits.”
Having concluded that Andreas met his burden of establishing a nexus
between the infringement and Audi's sale of TT coupes, we also believe that
the jury's award was not overly speculative. The total profit upon which the
jury based its award was limited to Audi's profit generated only by the sale
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of the TT coupe, and only during the time that the “Wake Up” commercial
aired. The evidence established that Audi sold 5,384 TT coupes in 1999, but
that number was reduced to account for the 238 pre-ordered vehicles,
leaving 5,146 TT coupe sales between May and the end of the year that
were potentially related to the infringing commercial. Audi realized
$153,700,000 gross revenue on the sale of the limited number of TT coupes
and an after-tax profit of $5,700,000. The jury awarded Andreas $570,000,
or 10% of that profit generated by the sale of the TT coupe during the time
period that the commercial aired as the profit attributable to Audi's
infringing use of Andreas's copyrighted work. Conversely, the jury
impliedly found that 90% of Audi's profit was attributable to factors other
than the infringement. As we have held, Audi bore the burden of
establishing the portion of its profit attributable to factors other than the
infringement. This evidence provides a nonspeculative basis for the jury's
award, and it is precisely the jury's function as the factfinder to do so. See,
e.g., Frank Music II, 886 F.2d at 1550 (affirming district court's factual
finding that 2% of casino's gaming and hotel profits were attributable to
promotional value of music revue)…..
We recognize that it is difficult to establish the portion of profits
attributable to an infringement in cases where the infringed material is used
in an advertisement for another product, but Congress put the burden of
establishing “elements of profit attributable to factors other than the
copyright work” on the defendant.
Conclusion
We reverse the district court's grant of Audi's judgment as a matter of
law and reinstate the jury's $570,000 award of profits. The district court's
rulings are affirmed in all other respects.
NOTES AND QUESTIONS
1.

In a lawsuit for copyright infringement, harm is often determined not
by how much the plaintiff actually suffered, as in common law, but
rather by how much the defendant infringer gained. While the plaintiff
is allowed to recover for actual harm, most of the disputes revolve
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around the plaintiff’s ability to recover for “any profits of the infringer
that are attributable to the infringement and are not taken into account in
computing actual damages.” 17 U.S.C. § 504(b). In the alternative to
actual harm, sometimes the plaintiff is much better off due to the
infringement. Consider the facts of the Andreas case. Was the artist any
worse off due to Audi’s use of “Angels of Mercy” in its commercials?
Was Andreas himself actually harmed in any way? Do more people
know of Andreas’ artwork because if Audi’s infringement?
2. While the Copyright Act does not differentiate between different types
of profits, the 9th Circuit did. In Mackie, Jack Mackie, a popular artist
in Seattle, sued the Seattle Symphony Orchestra for incorporating his
artwork in a promotional campaign without seeking prior approval. The
Court defined direct profits as “those that are generated by selling an
infringing product” and indirect profits as “the revenue that has a more
attenuated nexus to the infringement.” Mackie v. Reiser, 296 F.3d 909,
914 (9th Cir. 2002). Despite the different classifications, the court held
“a copyright holder must establish the existence of a causal link before
indirect profits damages can be recovered.” Id. The Andreas court
recognized the difficulty in quantifying such indirect profits. Is there a
justification in distinguishing between types of profits when the statute
provides no such guidance? Considering both direct and indirect profits
are subject to the same criteria in establishing infringement and a
remedy, does distinguishing them present any benefit to infringement
cases?
3. Section 504(b) of the Copyright Act provides that “In establishing the
infringer's profits, the copyright owner is required to present proof only
of the infringer's gross revenue, and the infringer is required to prove his
or her deductible expenses and the elements of profit attributable to
factors other than the copyrighted work.” 17 U.S.C. 504(b) (2010). In
other words, the plaintiff in an infringement case must prove (1) the
profits of the alleged infringer, (2) the plaintiff’s expenses in developing
the copyright, and (3) the amount of profits the alleged infringer
obtained specifically due to the alleged infringement. The court in
Andreas recognizes the difficulty this may present for the plaintiff in an
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indirect infringement case. Nevertheless, the initial burden remains
with the plaintiff.
Once the court has found infringement the burden shifts to
the defendant to prove that either the revenue obtained was not a profit,
or that the profits are attributable to factors other than those in the
copyrighted work. See Konor Enterprises, Inc. v. Eagle Publications,
Inc., 878 F.2d 138, 140 (4th Cir. 1989); Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens
Football Club, Inc. 346 F.3d 514, 520 (4th Cir. 2003). Since the
copyright owner is entitled to recover only the profits that are
attributable to the infringement, the defendant could conceivably
prevent the copyright holder from recovering any reimbursement. See
Cream Records, Inc. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co. 754 F.2d 826 (9th Cir.
1985). How fair is this shift of burden? Once infringement has been
discovered, should the infringer be able to present his or her own case to
avoid reimbursing the entitled owner? Should there be an automatic
remedy for plaintiffs who prove infringement, regardless of the
magnitude of such?
4. The Copyright Act also provides for “statutory” damages that a
copyright holder may obtain without regard to either its own losses or
the infringers profits. These damages can run as high as $150,000 per
instance of willful infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 504. They can become
debilitating when they are applied to secondary liability for passive
infringement by firms such as YouTube, which often commit
infringement when posters place infringing material on it. See MICHAEL
A. CARRIER, INNOVATION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: HARNESSING THE
POWER OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAW 148-161
(2009).
TY, INC. V. PUB. INT’L LTD.
292 F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 2002)
POSNER, Circuit Judge.
Ty is the manufacturer of Beanie Babies. These well-known beanbag
stuffed animals are copyrightable as “sculptural works,” 17 U.S.C. §§ 101,
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102(a)(5); Ty, Inc. v. GMA Accessories, Inc., 132 F.3d 1167, 1169 (7th
Cir.1997) and are copyrighted by Ty, which brought this suit for copyright
and trademark infringement against Publications International, Ltd. (PIL),
publisher of a series of books, with titles such as For the Love of Beanie
Babies and Beanie Babies Collector's Guide, that contain photographs of
Beanie Babies. PIL concedes that photographs of Beanie Babies are
derivative works, which, being copies of copyrighted works, can be
produced only under license from Ty-and PIL has no license. PIL's defense
to the charge of copyright infringement is the doctrine of fair use. On Ty's
motion for summary judgment, the district court rejected the defense,
granted the motion, and issued a permanent injunction against PIL's selling
any of its Beanie Babies books. It also awarded Ty PIL's profits from the
sale of those books, $1.36 million, plus more than $200,000 in prejudgment
interest…..
The defense of fair use, originally judge-made, now codified, plays
an essential role in copyright law. Without it, any copying of copyrighted
material would be a copyright infringement. A book reviewer could not
quote from the book he was reviewing without a license from the publisher.
Quite apart from the impairment of freedom of expression that would result
from giving a copyright holder control over public criticism of his work, to
deem such quotation an infringement would greatly reduce the credibility of
book reviews, to the detriment of copyright owners as a group, though not
to the owners of copyright on the worst books. Book reviews would no
longer serve the reading public as a useful guide to which books to buy.
Book reviews that quote from (“copy”) the books being reviewed increase
the demand for copyrighted works; to deem such copying infringement
would therefore be perverse, and so the fair-use doctrine permits such
copying. Desnick v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 44 F.3d 1345,
1351 (7th Cir.1995)(dictum); William M. Landes, “Copyright, Borrowed
Images, and Appropriation Art: An Economic Approach,” 9 Geo. Mason
L.Rev. 1, 10 (2000); Lawrence Lessig, “The Law of the Horse: What
Cyberlaw Might Teach,” 113 Harv. L.Rev. 501, 528 (1999). On the other
hand, were a book reviewer to quote the entire book in his review, or so
much of the book as to make the review a substitute for the book itself, he
would be cutting into the publisher's market, and the defense of fair use
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would fail.
Generalizing from this example in economic terminology that has
become orthodox in fair-use case law, we may say that copying that is
complementary to the copyrighted work (in the sense that nails are
complements of hammers) is fair use, but copying that is a substitute for the
copyrighted work (in the sense that nails are substitutes for pegs or screws),
or for derivative works from the copyrighted work…. If the price of nails
fell, the demand for hammers would rise but the demand for pegs would
fall. The hammer manufacturer wants there to be an abundant supply of
cheap nails, and likewise publishers want their books reviewed and wouldn't
want reviews inhibited and degraded by a rule requiring the reviewer to
obtain a copyright license from the publisher if he wanted to quote from the
book. So, in the absence of a fair-use doctrine, most publishers would
disclaim control over the contents of reviews. The doctrine makes such
disclaimers unnecessary. It thus economizes on transaction costs.
The distinction between complementary and substitutional copying
(sometimes-though as it seems to us, confusingly-said to be between
“transformative” and “superseding” copies, see, e.g., Campbell v. AcuffRose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)) is illustrated not only by the
difference between quotations from a book in a book review and the book
itself, Marion B. Stewart, “Calculating Economic Damages in Intellectual
Property Disputes: The Role of Market Definition,” 77 J. Patent &
Trademark Office Society 321, 332 (1995), but also by the difference
between parody (fair use) and burlesque (often not fair use). A parody,
which is a form of criticism (good-natured or otherwise), is not intended as
a substitute for the work parodied. But it must quote enough of that work to
make the parody recognizable as such, and that amount of quotation is
deemed fair use…. A burlesque, however, is often just a humorous
substitute for the original and so cuts into the demand for it: one might
choose to see Abbott and Costello Meet Frankenstein or Young
Frankenstein rather than Frankenstein, or Love at First Bite rather than
Dracula, or even Clueless rather than Emma. Burlesques of that character,
catering to the humor-loving segment of the original's market, are not fair
use…. The distinction is implicit in the proposition … that the parodist
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must not take more from the original than is necessary to conjure it up and
thus make clear to the audience that his work is indeed a parody. If he takes
much more, he may begin to attract the audience away from the work
parodied, not by convincing them that the work is no good (for that is not a
substitution effect) but by providing a substitute for it.
Book reviews and parodies are merely examples of types of work
that quote or otherwise copy from copyrighted works yet constitute fair use
because they are complements of (though sometimes negative
complements, as in the case of a devastating book review) rather than
substitutes for the copyrighted original. The commonest type is simply a
quotation from a copyrighted work in a book or article on the same or a
related subject. The complementary effect may be quite weak, but the
quotation is unlikely to reduce the demand for the copyrighted work; nor
could the copyright owner command a license fee commensurate with the
costs of transacting with the copier. Such copying is therefore fair use.
Were control of derivative works not part of a copyright owner's
bundle of rights, it would be clear that PIL's books fell on the complement
side of the divide and so were sheltered by the fair-use defense. A
photograph of a Beanie Baby is not a substitute for a Beanie Baby. No one
who wants a Beanie Baby, whether a young child who wants to play with it
or an adult (or older child) who wants to collect Beanie Babies, would be
tempted to substitute a photograph. But remember that photographs of
Beanie Babies are conceded to be derivative works, for which there may be
a separate demand that Ty may one day seek to exploit, and so someone
who without a license from Ty sold photographs of Beanie Babies would be
an infringer of Ty's sculpture copyrights. The complication here is that the
photographs are embedded in text, in much the same way that quotations
from a book are embedded in a review of the book. Ty regards the text that
surrounds the photographs in PIL's Beanie Baby books as incidental;
implicitly it compares the case to one in which a book reviewer quotes the
whole book in his review. Or to a case in which a purveyor of pornographic
pictures pastes a copy of the Declaration of Independence on the back of
each picture and argues that judged as a whole his product has redeeming
social value…. PIL argues, to the contrary, that the photographs are
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indispensable to the creation of a collectors' guide to Beanie Babies; and, as
we'll see shortly, collectors' guides are not derivative works.
The proper characterization of PIL's Beanie Baby books is the kind
of fact-laden issue appropriate for summary judgment only in extreme
cases, which this case is not-in part because of differences among the books
that the district court found infringed Ty's copyright. At one end of the
spectrum is For the Love of Beanie Babies. This large-print book with hard
shiny covers seems directed at a child audience. All the different Beanie
Babies, more than 150 of them, are pictured. Each picture is accompanied
by a brief commentary. Some of the commentary seems aimed exclusively
at a child (or infantile adult) audience, such as the commentary on Snip the
Siamese Cat: “That darn cat has nerve! Just like the real thing, Ty's Siamese
has plenty of attitude. The champagne-colored cat with blue-ringed black
eyes and chocolate-covered points is a beautiful specimen of the Far Eastern
breed. And she knows it! Stretched out on all fours, this finicky feline is the
only purebred in Ty's cathouse. This pretty kitty is definitely the cat's
meow.” The commentary seems distinctly secondary to the photograph. An
even clearer case is a two-page spread in For the Love of Beanie Babies
entitled “Kitty Corner,” which we reproduce (without Ty's permission!-a
good example of the fair-use doctrine in action) at the end of this opinion.
The text is childish and pretty clearly secondary to the more than full-page
photograph of feline Beanie Babies. Some of the commentary on
photographs in For the Love of Beanie Babies does contain information
relevant to collectors, such as “mint-condition Allys with older tags are very
difficult to find. Retired.” (“Retired” means no longer being manufactured.)
But For the Love of Beanie Babies might well be thought essentially just a
collection of photographs of Beanie Babies, and photographs of Beanie
Babies are derivative works from the copyrighted Beanie Babies
themselves.
At the opposite extreme is PIL's Beanie Babies Collector's Guide.
This is a small paperback book with small print, clearly oriented toward
adult purchasers-indeed, as the title indicates, toward collectors. Each page
contains, besides a photograph of a Beanie Baby, the release date, the
retired date, the estimated value of the Beanie Baby, and other information
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relevant to a collector, such as that “Spooky is the only Beanie ever to have
carried his designer's name,” or that “Prance should be a member of the
Beanie line for some time, so don't panic and pay high secondary-market
prices for her just because she's fairly new.”
Some of the text is quite critical, for example accusing Ty of
frequent trademark infringements. Ty doesn't like criticism, and so the
copyright licenses that it grants to those publishers whom it is willing to
allow to publish Beanie Baby collectors' guides reserve to it the right to veto
any text in the publishers' guides. It also forbids its licensees to reveal that
they are licensees of Ty. Its standard licensing agreement requires the
licensee to print on the title page and back cover of its publication the
following misleading statement: “This publication is not sponsored or
endorsed by, or otherwise affiliated with Ty Inc. All Copyrights and
Trademarks of Ty Inc. are used by permission. All rights reserved.” Notice
the analogy to a publisher's attempting to use licensing to prevent critical
reviews of its books-an attempt that the doctrine of fair use blocks. See
Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., supra, 268 F.3d at 1277
(concurring opinion).
But we do need to explain the oddity of there being collectors'
guides for a line of children's toys; otherwise it might seem clear that the
Beanie Babies Collector's Guide was a device for circumventing Ty's lawful
monopoly of derivative works. As a marketing gimmick, Ty deliberately
creates a shortage in each Beanie Baby by selling it at a very low price and
not producing enough copies to clear the market at that price. As a result, a
secondary market is created, just like the secondary market in works of art.
The secondary market gives widespread publicity to Beanie Babies, and the
shortage that creates the secondary market stampedes children into nagging
their parents to buy them the latest Beanie Babies, lest they be humiliated
by not possessing the Beanie Babies that their peers possess. Ty, Inc. v.
GMA Accessories, Inc., supra, 132 F.3d at 1171, 1173. The appeal is to the
competitive conformity of children-but also to the mentality of collectors.
When Beanie Babies Collector's Guide was published in 1998, some
Beanie Babies were selling in the secondary market for thousands of
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dollars, while others were selling for little more than their original purchase
price. The range was vast, creating a demand for collectors' guides. Ty
acknowledges as it must that a collectors' guide to a series of copyrighted
works is no more a derivative work than a book review is. We cannot find a
case on the point but the Copyright Act is clear. It defines a derivative work
as “a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation,
musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture
version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or
any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.” 17
U.S.C. § 101. A derivative work thus must either be in one of the forms
named or be “recast, transformed, or adapted.” The textual portions of a
collectors' guide to copyrighted works are not among the examples of
derivative works listed in the statute, and guides don't recast, transform, or
adapt the things to which they are guides. A guide to Parisian restaurants is
not a recasting, transforming, or adapting of Parisian restaurants. Indeed, a
collectors' guide is very much like a book review, which is a guide to a
book and which no one supposes is a derivative work. Both the book review
and the collectors' guide are critical and evaluative as well as purely
informational; and ownership of a copyright does not confer a legal right to
control public evaluation of the copyrighted work.
Ty's concession that a Beanie Babies collectors' guide is not a
derivative work narrows the issue presented by PIL's appeal nicely (at least
as to those books that are plausibly regarded as collectors' guides) to
whether PIL copied more than it had to in order to produce a marketable
collectors' guide. Ty points out that PIL's books copied (more precisely,
made photographic copies of) the entire line of Beanie Babies, just like the
book reviewer who copies the entire book. But the cases are clear that a
complete copy is not per se an unfair use, see, e.g., Sony Corp. v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 447-50; id. at 480 (dissenting opinion)..,
and the suggested analogy overlooks the fact that a collectors' guide, to
compete in the marketplace, has to be comprehensive. Given that Ty can
license (in fact has licensed) the publication of collectors' guides that
contain photos of all the Beanie Babies, how could a competitor forbidden
to publish photos of the complete line compete? And if it couldn't compete,
the result would be to deliver into Ty's hands a monopoly of Beanie Baby
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collectors' guides even though Ty acknowledges that such guides are not
derivative works and do not become such by being licensed by it. Castle
Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publishing Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132,
145 n. 11 (2d Cir.1998) (“by developing or licensing a market for parody,
news reporting, educational or other transformative uses of its own creative
work, a copyright owner plainly cannot prevent others from entering those
fair use markets”); see Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix
Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 607-08 (9th Cir.2000); Twin Peaks Productions, Inc.
v. Publications Int'l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1377 (2d Cir.1993) (“the author of
‘Twin Peaks' cannot preserve for itself the entire field of publishable works
that wish to cash in on the ‘Twin Peaks' phenomenon”).
Granted, there is some question how, if Beanie Babies collectors'
guides are indeed a complement to Beanie Babies (and they are), and Ty has
a monopoly of Beanie Babies (and it does), Ty can get a second monopoly
profit by taking over the guides market. The higher the price it charges for
guides, the lower will be the demand for such guides and hence for
collecting Beanie Babies and so the less effective will Ty's strategy of
marketing Beanie Babies as collectibles be. This is the sort of question that
has engendered skepticism among economists about the antitrust rule
against tie-in agreements. But there is an answer here: Ty wants to suppress
criticism of its product in these guides.
Ty goes so far as to argue that PIL not only cannot publish photos of
all the Beanie Babies but cannot publish color photos of any of them, and
perhaps cannot publish black and white photos of any of them or even
sketches but must instead be content with the name of the Beanie Baby and
a verbal description. Such a guide would sink like a stone in the
marketplace no matter how clever and informative its text, since Ty licenses
publishers to publish photos of all the Beanie Babies in the licensees'
collectors' guides. It would be like trying to compete with a CD of
Beethoven's Fifth Symphony by selling the score.
We have thus far discussed the application of the fair-use doctrine in
terms of the purpose of the doctrine rather than its statutory definition,
which though extensive is not illuminating. (More can be less, even in law.)
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The statute provides that “the fair use of a copyrighted work ... for purposes
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching ... scholarship or
research, is not an infringement of copyright.” 17 U.S.C. § 107. (Notice that
the purposes listed are illustrative rather than comprehensive. Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., supra, 510 U.S. at 577-78.) In deciding whether a
particular use is fair, the “factors to be considered shall include”-and notice
again that the listing is illustrative rather than exhaustive; Congress
“intended that courts continue the common law tradition of fair use
adjudication” and section 107 “permits and requires courts to avoid rigid
application of the copyright statute, when, on occasion, it would stifle the
very creativity which that law is designed to foster,” -- (1) the purpose and
character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature
or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted
work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work.” Factors (1) and (2) are empty,
except that (1) suggests a preference for noncommercial educational uses,
picking up the reference earlier in the statute to “teaching ... scholarship or
research.” Factor (3) is inapplicable to Beanie Babies, each one of which is
copyrighted separately, so that there can be no partial copying as a matter of
fact (no one, we imagine, wants a photograph of part of a Beanie Baby).
Factor (4) at least glances at the distinction we noted earlier between
substitute and complementary copying, since the latter does not impair the
potential market or value of the copyrighted work except insofar as it
criticizes the work, which is the opposite of taking a free ride on its value.
The important point is simply that, as the Supreme Court made clear
not only in Campbell but also in Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, the
four factors are a checklist of things to be considered rather than a formula
for decision; and likewise the list of statutory purposes. … Because the
factors and purposes are not exhaustive, Ty can get nowhere in defending
the judgment by arguing that some or even all of them lean against the
defense of fair use. The question is whether it would be unreasonable to
conclude, with reference to one or more of the enjoined publications, such
as the Beanie Babies Collector's Guide, that the use of the photos is a fair
use because it is the only way to prepare a collectors' guide.
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Ty relies primarily on two cases. Twin Peaks Productions, Inc. v.
Publications International, Ltd., involved a book published by PIL
concerning a television series. The book included a detailed recounting of
the plot of the first eight episodes: “every intricate plot twist and element of
character development appear in the Book in the same sequence as in the
teleplays.” The court held that the book was basically an abridgment of the
script and that abridgments (despite contrary, aged authority) are generally
not fair use. The plot summaries were so extensive as to be substitutes for
rather than complements of the copyrighted scripts.
The other case on which Ty principally relies, Castle Rock
Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publishing Group, Inc., involved another
television series, Seinfeld, and another book, The Seinfeld Aptitude Test, a
collection of trivia questions testing viewers' knowledge of obscure details
of the series' plot and characters. There was evident complementarity:
people who bought the book had to watch the show in order to pick up the
answers to the questions in the book; no one would read the book in lieu of
watching the show. When the book first appeared, the show's producers
requested free copies and distributed them as promotional material, and the
book's blurb told readers to “open this book to satisfy your between-episode
cravings.” The court nevertheless held that the book wasn't insulated from
copyright liability by the doctrine of fair use. The holding seems to rest in
part, and very dubiously we must say, on the court's judgment that the book
was frivolous.
“Undoubtedly, innumerable books could ‘expose’ the
‘nothingness' or otherwise comment upon, criticize, educate the public
about, or research Seinfeld and contemporary television culture. The
[Seinfeld Aptitude Test], however, is not such a book.” But the fair-use
doctrine is not intended to set up the courts as judges of the quality of
expressive works. That would be an unreasonable burden to place on
judges, as well as raising a First Amendment question.
But there was more to the court's decision. The Seinfeld Aptitude
Test may have been a subterfuge for copying the script of the television
series-and the script was a derivative work. The court said that “each ‘fact’
tested by The SAT is in reality fictitious expression created by Seinfeld's
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authors. The SAT does not quiz such true facts as the identity of the actors
in Seinfeld, the number of days it takes to shoot an episode, the biographies
of the actors, the location of the Seinfeld set, etc. Rather, The SAT tests
whether the reader knows that the character Jerry places a Pez dispenser on
Elaine's leg during a piano recital, that Kramer enjoys going to the airport
because he's hypnotized by the baggage carousels, and that Jerry, opining
on how to identify a virgin, said ‘It's not like spotting a toupee.’ ” Castle
Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publishing Group, Inc., supra, 150 F.3d at
139. A similar judgment might be possible here with regard to For the Love
of Beanie Babies, which we described as basically just a picture book; and
the pictures are derivative works from Ty's copyrighted soft sculptures. This
raises the question whether, while summary judgment is plainly not
warranted with regard to all the books that the district court found infringed
Ty's copyrights, it might be warranted with regard to some of them,
specifically For the Love of Beanie Babies. However, three reasons counsel
against this course. The first is that the record actually contains not one but
three versions of For the Love of Beanie Babies, and our earlier description
was of the one furthest removed from a collectors' guide; the others are
closer. Second, Ty is not asking us to consider the appropriateness of partial
summary judgment. Third, and related to the second point, the briefs do not
analyze the various books separately, making us reluctant to rule separately
on them. We do not preclude consideration on remand of the possibility of
partial summary judgment…..
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
NOTES AND QUESTIONS
1. In his Ty, Inc. opinion, Judge Posner states “The defense of fair use,
originally judge-made, now codified, plays an essential role in copyright
law. Without it, any copying of copyrighted material would be a
copyright infringement.” The Copyright Act provides that “the fair use
of a copyrighted work . . . for purposes such as criticism, comment,
news reporting, teaching . . . scholarship or research, is not an
infringement of copyright.” 17 U.S.C. § 107. The statute also outlines
four factors when considering fair use: (1) the purpose and character of
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the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.” Id.
2. Derivative Works – Complements vs. Substitutes. The
Copyright Act defines a derivative work as “a work based upon one or
more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement,
dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording,
art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which
a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.” 17 U.S.C. § 101.
Derivative works can frequently be divided into two categories:
complements and substitutes. Complement works seek to enhance a
copyrighted work, and are often defended using the fair use doctrine.
However, substitute works are often infringing, as they seek to replace a
current copyrighted work and therefore cause direct harm to the plaintiff
in an infringement suit. Needless to say, complementary works are fair
use, as the “effect of the use upon the potential market” is unlikely to
decrease demand for the copyrighted work. However, since a substitute
work is meant to encroach on the market created by the copyrighted
work and take away from potential profits, it is almost always
infringement.
3. Parody. For the purposes of copyright law, parody is “the use of some
elements of a prior author's composition to create a new one that, at
least in part, comments on that author's works.” Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580 (1994). As Judge Posner identifies in his
Ty, Inc. opinion, a parody is not meant to substitute for the original
work, but is a form a criticism that requires a certain amount of
quotation in order to get its point across. Therefore, parody is often a
“fair use” of copyrighted material.
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., is the best known parody
copyright incringement case. In 1964, Roy Orbison released the hit
song “Oh, Pretty Woman.” The song is probably best known, however,
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as the theme song for the 1990 hit movie Pretty Woman, starring Julia
Roberts and Richard Gere. In 1989, 2 Live Crew, a popular rap group,
released a bawdy parody of Orbison’s hit single. The parody opened to
the now-famous bass line of “Oh, Pretty Woman” but then progressed to
lyrics that were crass and offensive. Acuff-Rose Music, who owned the
rights to Orbison’s work, filed an infringement suit. The U.S. Supreme
Court began its discussion of the case by stating “It is uncontested here
that 2 Live Crew's song would be an infringement of Acuff-Rose's
rights in ‘Oh, Pretty Woman,’ under the Copyright Act of 1976, but for
a finding of fair use through parody.” Id. at 574. The Court found
compelling reasons for protecting parody from claims of copyright
infringement, concluded that 2 Live Crew’s song may very well be a
parody and remanded the decision to the Circuit Court.
GARRETSON V. CLARK
111 U.S. 120 (1884)
FIELD, J.
The patent was for an improvement in the construction of mop-heads,
which may be described, with sufficient accuracy, as an improvement in the
method of moving and securing in place the movable jam or clamp of a
mop-head. With the exception of this mode of clamping, mop-heads like the
plaintiff's had been in use time out of mind. Before the master, the plaintiff
proved the cost of his mop-heads, and the price at which they were sold,
and claimed the right to recover the difference as his damages. This rule
was rejected….
When a patent is for an improvement, and not for an entirely new
machine or contrivance, the patentee must show in what particulars his
improvement has added to the usefulness of the machine or contrivance. He
must separate its results distinctly from those of the other parts, so that the
benefits derived from it may be distinctly seen and appreciated. The rule on
this head is aptly stated by Mr. Justice BLATCHFORD in the court below:
‘The patentee,’ he says, ‘must in every case give evidence tending to
separate or apportion the defendant's profits and the patentee's damages
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between the patented feature and the unpatented features, and such evidence
must be reliable and tangible, and not conjectural or speculative; or he must
show, by equally reliable and satisfactory evidence, that the profits and
damages are to be calculated on the whole machine, for the reason that the
entire value of the whole machine, as a marketable article, is properly and
legally attributable to the patented feature.’ The plaintiff complied with
neither part of this rule. He produced no evidence to apportion the profits or
damages between the improvement constituting the patented feature and the
other features of the mop. His evidence went only to show the cost of the
whole mop, and the price at which it was sold. And, of course, it could not
be pretended that the entire value of the mop-head was attributable to the
feature patented. So the whole case ended, the rule was not followed, and
the decree is therefore affirmed.
NOTES AND QUESTIONS
1. Section 101 of the Patent Act states that “Whoever invents or discovers .
. . any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent
therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.” 35
U.S.C. 101. Not only does the patent act provide for patents on new
inventions, but also improvements on old inventions. However, not all
improvements are patentable. In order to pass the nonobvious
requirement of patents, the patentee must prove that the invention is not
obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art (“PHOSITA”), and
not whether it is an improvement over the prior art. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
In his opinion above, Justice Field enforces the purpose of the patent act
by stating that in order to obtain a patent, the patentee must show “in
what particulars his improvement has added to the usefulness of the
machine” and that the “benefits derived from [the improvement] may be
distinctly seen and appreciated.” How should licensing come into play
in these cases? How innovative does an improvement have to be to
obtain a patent?
2. The problem of After-Arising Technology. When filing a patent
application, inventors sometimes seek to patent the invention as well as
all uses/improvements on the patent that the inventor could have
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reasonable foreseen. As long as the inventor discloses the embodiments
of his invention under § 112 of the Patent Act, he will generally be
given the exclusive rights over later uses of his invention that use “afterarising” technologytechnology not known at the time the patent is
filed. See Mark A. Lemley, et al, Life After Bilski, 63 Stanford L. Rev.
1315 (2011). Is this fair to inventors in general? Should patents cover
after-arising technology whether or not they were foreseeable, or would
including such after-arising technology stifle innovation rather than
protect it? See Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247 (Fed.
Cir. 2004).
3.

Proving Damages. Section 284 of the Patent Act provides, “Upon
finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant damages
adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a
reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer,
together with interest and costs as fixed by the court.” 35 U.S.C. § 284
(2010).
In determining the amount of damages to which a patentee may
be entitled, Judge Field reiterates the conclusions of the lower court,
stating, “The patentee . . . must in every case give evidence tending to
separate or apportion the defendant's profits and the patentee's damages
between the patented feature and the unpatented features, and such
evidence must be reliable and tangible.” However, in order to prove
damages, the patentee has to show not only that the defendant captured
sales from infringing on the patent, but that he actually captured them
from the patentee herself.
Cf. Mosler Safe Co. v. Ely-Norris Safe Co. 273 U.S. 132
(1926), a common law case involving the tort of “palming off,” an
antecedent of trademark infringement. Mosler was a safe company that
held a patent on safes with interior explosive chambers that would jam a
deadbolt into the frame when the safe detected tampering. A brass strip
around the outside of the safe indicated the chamber and served as a
trademark. Ely-Norris, another safe company, began to make safes that
looked nearly identical to Mosler’s safes. The defendant’s safes bore

INNOVATION AND COMPETITION POLICY
Hovenkamp

Chapter 3, Page 29
Jan., 2013

the metal strip but lacked the exploding chamber. Mosler sued for
palming off, a form of trademark infringement, and sought damages for
lost profits.
However, Ely-Norris was able to present evidence that Mosler
was not the only safe manufacturing company that made safes with
exploding chambers. Justice Holmes’s opinion for the Supreme Court
observed that because several competitors manufactured similar safes
Mosler could not prove that sales made by Ely-Norris had actually been
stolen from Mosler. As a result Mosler could not prove lost profits.
IP INNOVATION, LLC v. RED HAT, Inc.
705 F.Supp.2d 687 (E.D.Tex. 2010)
RADER, Judge.
Defendants Red Hat, Inc. and Novell, Inc. seek to exclude the
testimony and strike the expert report of Mr. Joseph Gemini. Mr. Gemini is
Plaintiffs IP Innovation L.L.C. and Technology Licensing Corp.'s (“IPI”)
expert on reasonably royalty damages. This court GRANTS-IN-PART and
DENIES-IN-PART the motion.
Under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, a court may
permit opinion testimony from an expert only if such testimony “will assist
the trier of fact” and “(1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or
data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and
(3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts
of the case.” The district courts act as gatekeepers tasked with the inquiry
into whether expert testimony is “not only relevant, but reliable.” Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993). This court must
exclude testimony that does not meet the requirements of Rule 702.
In a suit for patent infringement, a successful plaintiff is entitled to
“damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less
than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer,
together with interest and costs as fixed by the court.” 35 U.S.C. § 284
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(2006). The statute authorizes two categories of infringement compensation:
lost profits and reasonably royalty damages. Lucent Techs., Inc. v.
Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1324 (Fed.Cir.2009). Because IPI does not
manufacture or sell products incorporating the patents-in-suit, it has not
sought, and is not entitled to, lost profits.
A reasonable royalty contemplates a hypothetical negotiation
between the patentee and the infringer at a time before the infringement
began. Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc., 718 F.2d 1075, 1078
(Fed.Cir.1983). Critically, the hypothetical negotiation presumes that the
patentee is a willing licensor and the alleged infringer is a willing licensee,
with both parties assuming the patent was valid, enforceable, and infringed.
Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F.Supp. 1116, 1120
(S.D.N.Y.1970). The Federal Circuit “requires sound economic proof of the
nature of the market and likely outcomes with infringement factored out of
the economic picture” in all damages calculations. Grain Processing Corp.
v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 185 F.3d 1341, 1350 (Fed.Cir.1999). Although
some approximation is permitted in calculating the reasonable royalty, the
Federal Circuit requires “sound economic and factual predicates” for that
analysis. Riles v. Shell Exploration & Production Co., 298 F.3d 1302, 1311
(Fed.Cir.2002) (citation omitted). Where, as here, such sound economic and
factual predicates are absent from a reasonable royalty analysis, Rule 702
requires this court to exclude that unreliable proffered evidence.
A reliable reasonable royalty calculation depends on trustworthy
evidence of both the royalty base and the royalty rate. Mr. Gemini invoked
the “entire market value rule” in identifying the royalty base in this case.
Under the entire market value rule, damages are recoverable only “if the
patented apparatus was of such paramount importance that it substantially
created the value of the component parts.” Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co.,
Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1549 (Fed.Cir.1995) (citation omitted). Therefore, “the
patentee must prove that the patent-related feature is the basis for customer
demand.” Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1336.
In this case, IPI has accused Red Hat's and Novell's Linux-based
operating systems of infringing the patents-in-suit, including the Enterprise
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Linux Desktop and Server products. IPI alleges that the operating systems'
multiple virtual workspaces and workspace switching features infringe the
patents-in-suit. In invoking the “entire market value rule,” Mr. Gemini
included 100% of Red Hat's and Novell's total revenues from sales of
subscriptions to the accused operating systems in his proposed royalty base.
Mr. Gemini's methodology however does not show a sound economic
connection between the claimed invention and this broad proffered royalty
base.
The claimed invention is but one relatively small component of the
accused operating systems. The evidence shows that the workspace
switching feature represents only one of over a thousand components
included in the accused products. Mr. Gemini relies on an online user forum
for a third-party product to show that some users tout a desktop switching
feature as essential. However, selected users' statements in isolation and
without a relationship to the actual claimed technology do not show an
accurate economic measurement of total market demand for the switching
feature, let alone its contribution to the demand for the entire product
asserted as the royalty base. The workspace switching feature's small role in
the overall product is further confirmed when one considers the relative
importance of certain other features such as security, interoperability, and
virtualization. Moreover this proffered evidence has no economic
foundation.
Contrary to the proffer of Mr. Gemini, the record-even at this
pretrial stage after discovery-suggests that users do not buy the accused
operating systems for their workspace switching feature. Most of Red Hat's
and Novell's accused sales come from their Server products, the majority of
which are not connected to a display and thus do not take advantage of the
workspace switching feature. Mr. Gemini made no effort to factor out of his
proffered royalty base these products which do not even feature the claimed
invention. Once again, this blatant oversight shows that Mr. Gemini did not
use the type of reliable economic principles and methods required by Rule
702 for an economic damages expert. Also, the record shows that some
accused operating systems are sold to the public with a default setting that
does not enable the workspace switching feature. Mr. Gemini made no
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effort to factor out of his proffered royalty base those operating systems in
which the user never affirmatively enables the claimed switching feature. In
fact, he made no effort to even discern the percentage of users who would
never enable or use the claimed feature. This aspect of his questionable
methodology also shows inattention to the economic and factual data
necessary for a reliable assessment of a compensatory royalty. Overall, Mr.
Gemini never accounts for the record evidence that most users of the
accused operating systems do not seem to use the workspace switching
feature at all. Accordingly, the record cannot support the unfounded
conclusion that the often-unused feature drives demand for a royalty base of
100% of the operating systems as a whole. In sum, this stunning
methodological oversight makes it very difficult for this court to give any
credibility to Mr. Gemini's assertion that the claimed feature is the “basis
for customer demand.”
IPI tries to shift the burden to Red Hat and Novell, complaining that
they did not provide sufficient information for Mr. Gemini to determine the
value of the desktop switching feature relative to other features of the
accused products. IPI argues that the defendants' desktop switching feature
has no separate valuation, no aftermarket, and thus no way to value the
accused feature separately. This court, however, must insist under the law
that IPI, not Red Hat or Novell, has the burden of proving damages by a
preponderance of evidence. IPI cannot blame the defendants for Mr.
Gemini's assertion of 100% of the revenue as royalty base. IPI must show
some plausible economic connection between the invented feature and the
accused operating systems before using the market value of the entire
product as the royalty base.
Another reason for excluding Mr. Gemini's expert testimony is that
he arbitrarily picked a royalty rate that is much higher than the existing
royalty rates for licenses to the patents-in-suit. As a “starting point” for
determining the royalty rate, Mr. Gemini used a 2004 publication titled
“Licensing Economics Review” (“LER”) by AUE Consultants and a 2004
study by Navigant Consulting. LER indicated that the average royalty rate
for the Software industry was 11.6% of revenues with a median of 7.5 % of
revenues. Navigant Consulting's study indicated that for Computer and
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Electronic Products Manufacturing industry, royalty rates were at a high of
40.0%, a low of 1.0%, a mean of 10.2%, and median of 6.0% of revenues.
However, “software industry” and “computer and electronic products
manufacturing industry” encompass much more than the desktop switching
feature at issue in this case. Mr. Gemini offers no evidence that the alleged
industry agreements are in any way comparable to the patents-in-suit. See
ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 869-71 (Fed.Cir.2010)
(discrediting license agreements because “none of these licenses even
mentioned the patents in suit or showed any other discernible link to the
claimed technology”).
Instead of relying on these studies, Mr. Gemini should have at least
inaugurated his analysis with reference to the existing licenses to the
patents-in-suit. See Georgia-Pacific, 318 F.Supp. at 1120 (considering past
and present royalties received by the patentee “for the licensing of the
patent-in-suit, proving or tending to prove an established royalty”). “An
established royalty is usually the best measure of a ‘reasonable’ royalty for
a given use of an invention because it removes the need to guess at the
terms to which parties would hypothetically agree.” Monsanto Co. v.
McFarling, 488 F.3d 973, 978-79 (Fed.Cir.2007) (citation omitted). The
previous owner of the patents-in-suit, Xerox Corporation, entered into
several license agreements that involved one or more of the patents-in-suit.
At least two of these agreements were entered into outside of the context of
litigation and thus appropriate as touchstones for determining the
appropriate royalty rate in this case. Mr. Gemini disregarded these licenses
because Xerox entered into these agreements in the mid-1990's, a decade
before the alleged hypothetical negotiation date. However, these licenses
are far more relevant than the general market studies on which Mr. Gemini
primarily relied in his expert report. A credible economic approach might
have tried to account for the passage of time since the 1990's agreements on
the patents in this case, rather than reject them out of hand.
Accordingly, Mr. Gemini's current expert report improperly inflates
both the royalty base and the royalty rate by relying on irrelevant or
unreliable evidence and by failing to account for the economic realities of
this claimed component as part of a larger system. This court hereby
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precludes Mr. Gemini from testifying at the trial of this case or otherwise
presenting his opinions on the issue of damages based on his current expert
report. Given the lack of evidence in the record relating to damages, this
court will entertain appropriate motions to repair and prepare a record
suitable for trial on the issue of damages. This court will entertain
appropriate motions and responses on the topic of damages. The parties are
reminded that expert testimony on the topic of damages will not be allowed
absent a firm basis in accepted economic principles with an eye to the facts
of this record.
It is SO ORDERED.
RICOH CO., LTD. V. QUANTA COMPUTER, INC.
2010 WL 1607908 (W.D.Wis.,2010)
CRABB, District Judge.
A jury found that defendants Quanta Computer, Inc. and Quanta
Storage, Inc. indirectly infringed two patents related to optical disc drives
owned by plaintiff Ricoh Company, Ltd., U.S. Patent No.
5,063,552 and U.S. Patent No. 6, 661,755…. Now before the court is
plaintiff's motion for a permanent injunction… Because I conclude that
plaintiff cannot satisfy the four-factor test for obtaining a permanent
injunction set out in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388
(2006), I am denying plaintiff's request for a permanent injunction. In
accordance with Paise LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1315
(Fed.Cir.2007), the parties will be directed to “negotiate a license amongst
themselves regarding future use” of the 755 patent.
In eBay, the Supreme Court rejected the view that, in patent cases,
“injunctions should be denied only in the unusual case, under exceptional
circumstances and in rare instances ... to protect the public interest.”
Rather, the same standard for obtaining a permanent injunction applies in
patent cases as in any other case. The plaintiff must show that (1) it has
suffered an irreparable injury; (2) the remedies available at law are
inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) considering the balance of
hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is
warranted; and (4) the public interest would not be disserved by a
permanent injunction.
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In this case, there are few reasons to grant a permanent injunction
and many that counsel against doing so. To begin with, it is undisputed that
plaintiff does not practice the invention in the 755 patent. In fact, plaintiff
no longer manufactures or sells any disc drives. The best case for obtaining
a permanent injunction often occurs when the plaintiff and defendant are
competing in the same market. In that context, the harm in allowing the
defendant to continue infringing is the greatest. Because plaintiff is not
competing with defendants for the same customers, it is more difficult for
plaintiff to argue that it will be irreparably harmed without an injunction.
Plaintiff is correct that it is possible for a non-practicing entity to
satisfy the four-factor test. “For example, some patent holders, such as
university researchers or self-made inventors, might reasonably prefer to
license their patents, rather than undertake efforts to secure the financing
necessary to bring their works to market themselves.” eBay, 547 U.S. at
393. Of course, plaintiff is not a researcher or a self-made inventor. Rather,
plaintiff may be more akin to an entity that four Justices concluded in their
concurrence generally is not entitled to a permanent injunction:
An industry has developed in which firms use patents not as
a basis for producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for
obtaining licensing fees. For these firms, an injunction, and the
potentially serious sanctions arising from its violation, can be
employed as a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to
companies that seek to buy licenses to practice the patent. When the
patented invention is but a small component of the product the
companies seek to produce and the threat of an injunction is
employed simply for undue leverage in negotiations, legal damages
may well be sufficient to compensate for the infringement and an
injunction may not serve the public interest.
eBay, 547 U.S. at 396-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring with Stevens, J., Souter.
J., and Breyer, J.)
As defendants point out, plaintiff has not been miserly in issuing
licenses for the 755 patent for any company willing to pay for one.
Plaintiff's own witnesses testified at trial that plaintiff has issued licenses to
Sony, Hitachi, Toshiba, Matsushita, Panasonic, Lite-On, BenQ, Pioneer,
Phillips and IBM. Plaintiff even issued a license to ASUS after that
company was dismissed from this case for lack of personal jurisdiction. In
fact, plaintiff does not identify any sellers of optical disc drives other than
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defendants that have not yet taken a license. Thus, plaintiff cannot argue
persuasively that it is trying to narrowly limit the practice of its invention
rather than simply maximize a potential licensing fee. Also, as in the
hypothetical situation discussed by Justice Kennedy, plaintiff's patent “is
but a small component of the product [defendants] seek to produce,” which
is another factor suggesting that “legal damages may well be sufficient to
compensate for the infringement and an injunction may not serve the public
interest.” eBay.
Plaintiff says that defendants' “competitors will be encouraged to
infringe the '755 patent” and that plaintiff's “entire licensing program
worldwide will suffer because other manufacturers will be tempted to roll
the dice and infringe [plaintiff's] patents” if plaintiff does not obtain an
injunction. The first part of this argument assumes that there are any
competitors left who do not have a license already. Further, with respect to
both arguments, plaintiff fails to point to any evidence showing that an
injunction would have a greater deterrent effect than a compulsory license.
Plaintiff says that, absent a threat of an injunction, infringers would have
nothing to lose by forcing plaintiff to sue them, but this overlooks the cost
of litigation as well as the possibility of a finding of willful infringement
and an award of attorney fees for asserting a frivolous position. Even if I
assumed that injunctions generally have a greater deterrent effect, plaintiff
fails to explain why that factor weighs more heavily in this case than in any
other case in which a court must determine whether a permanent injunction
is appropriate. The logical conclusion of plaintiff's argument is to return to
the view rejected by the Court in eBay that plaintiffs in patent cases are
entitled to a permanent injunction as a matter of course because injunctions
always serve as a better deterrent than an ongoing royalty.
The balance of harms does not weigh heavily in either direction, but
overall I believe that factor favors defendants. Both sides have taken
varying positions regarding the feasibility of designing around the 755
patent, depending on which position serves a particular argument. However,
even if the invention in the 755 patent is not the only way to perform buffer
underrun protection, implementing a new design is complicated by the fact
that defendants do not manufacture the infringing component in the drives.
Thus, defendants would have to convince the manufacturer to come up with
a noninfringing alternative or alter the component themselves after
purchasing it from the manufacturer. Plaintiff has not shown that either of
these possibilities is realistic.
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Alternatively, plaintiff argues that defendants could limit their sales
of drives to companies that have licenses or “sell drives destined for
countries other than the United States.” However, neither of these options
makes much sense. Restricting defendants' sales to particular companies
benefits neither plaintiff nor defendants, but simply funnels defendants'
business toward third parties. With respect to the other option, plaintiff fails
to explain how defendants would be able to predict or control which
country a disc drive was “destined” for when they sell drives to companies
such as Dell or Gateway.
With respect to the question whether plaintiff has adequate legal
remedies, plaintiff argues that calculating an ongoing reasonable royalty
rate is not feasible in this case because defendant “Quanta Storage does not
track its total sales in the United States.” That argument is undermined by
the trial in this case, in which plaintiff seemed to have little difficulty
proposing a reasonable royalty rate to the jury for past infringement.
Certainly, the difficulty of calculating a reasonable royalty rate is no
greater than crafting an appropriate injunction and then enforcing it. The
jury did not find that defendants made or sold any infringing products in the
United States, only that defendants contributed to infringement by others or
actively induced it. Thus, crafting an appropriate injunction is not as simple
as listing particular products that defendants may not sell in the United
States; rather, it would require prohibiting defendants from engaging in
particular acts that might constitute indirect infringement. Plaintiff's
proposed injunction states generally that defendants are prohibited from
“selling in the United States-directly or indirectly-offering for sale or
importing into the United States, or otherwise inducing or encouraging use
of [infringing] drives in the United States.” That language is so vague that it
likely would violate the specificity requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 65. Nuxoll
ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie School Dist. # 204, 523 F.3d 668, 675 (7th
Cir.2008) (“[A]n injunction ... must contain a detailed and specific
statement of its terms.”); Patriot Homes, Inc. v. Forest River Housing,
Inc., 512 F.3d 412, 415 (7th Cir.2008) (“The preliminary injunction entered
by the district court uses a collection of verbs to prohibit [the defendant]
from engaging in certain conduct, but ultimately it fails to detail what the
conduct is.”). Monitoring and enforcing the injunction would be even more
difficult because it would require plaintiff to determine when defendants
were “encouraging” or “inducing” infringement and also when a third party
was engaging in acts of direct infringement. Plaintiff does not identify how
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this could be accomplished without repeated trips to this court for
evidentiary hearings.
Finally, plaintiff has failed to show that the public interest would be
better served through an injunction rather than a compulsory license.
Plaintiff argues that the “Constitutional goal of promoting science” under
Article I, § 8 favors an injunction. Again, plaintiff fails to identify any facts
in this case that would help serve that purpose more than with respect to any
other claim for patent infringement. In fact, plaintiff has not shown that an
injunction would serve any purpose other than to increase its leverage in
negotiations for a higher licensing fee. Because that is not an adequate
ground for an injunction, plaintiff's motion for a permanent injunction will
be denied.
In many cases, if an injunction is not appropriate, the plaintiff may be
entitled to an ongoing royalty…. [T]he general rule is “to allow the parties
to negotiate a license amongst themselves regarding future use of a patented
invention before imposing an ongoing royalty. Should the parties fail to
come to an agreement, the district court [may] step in to assess a reasonable
royalty in light of the ongoing infringement.” Accordingly, I will direct the
parties to engage in negotiations regarding an appropriate royalty.
NOTES AND QUESTIONS
1. The Patent Act provides that an infringed patentee is entitled damages
adequate to compensate for infringement. In such a case, there are three
types of remedies a patentee may seek: (1) a reasonable royalty, (2) lost
profits, and (3) an injunction. In determining the type and amount of
damages, a court must ask “had the Infringer not infringed, what would the
Patent Holder have made?” Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d
1301, 1324 (Fed.Cir.2009). A reasonable royalty and lost profits are paid
out in a monetary sum to the patentee, while an injunction simply forces the
infringer to cease from all operations constituting infringement.
2. “A reasonable royalty is, of course, merely the floor below which
damages shall not fall.” Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d
1301, 1324 (Fed.Cir.2009). There are two approaches for calculating a
reasonable royalty. The first is an analytical method, which involves
“subtracting the infringer's usual or acceptable net profit from its anticipated
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net profit realized from sales of infringing devices.” TWM Mfg. Co. v.
Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 899 (Fed.Cir.1986). The second, which is more
common, is the hypothetical negotiation or the “willing licensor-willing
licensee” approach. This method attempts to determine the royalty upon
which the parties would have agreed had they successfully negotiated an
agreement before infringement began. See Lucent Techs, 580 F.3d at 1324.
See also Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F.Supp. 1116
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (listing fifteen criteria fact-finders consider in determining
what amounts to a reasonable royalty).
“Lost profits may be in the form of diverted sales, eroded prices, or
increased expenses. The patent owner must establish a causation between
his lost profits and the infringement. A factual basis for the causation is that
“but for” the infringement, the patent owner would have made the sales that
the infringer made, charged higher prices, or incurred lower expenses.”
Lam, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp. 718 F.2d 1056 (1983). In claiming for
lost profits, the patentee is not required to prove an absolute profit, but only
a reasonable probability of profits. Id. However, the patentee must make
effort to prove that he specfically lost profits, otherwise all the patentee may
be able to recover is a reasonable royalty. Georgia-Pacific, 318 F.Supp. at
1129.
See also LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 694 F.3d 51
(Fed. Cir. 2012), in which the court held that an expert could not base the
patentee's damages on a percentage of the value of an entire laptop
computer when the patent in question was on a device that enabled the
optical drive to determine what type of disc had been inserted. How much
does it matter what the base is, as long as the royalty percentage is adjusted
accordingly? The court remanded for a determining of a hypothetically
negotiated reasonable royalty.
3. When a patent owner cannot show lost profits, which is the norm
in markets that contain numerous patents and competitively structure
markets, patent damages are often based on a hypothetical royalty
negotiation. What royalty would the parties have negotiated had they done
so ex ante? An important principle in such negotiations is opportunity cost,
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or the idea that a buyer will not pay more for a license than for an equally
good alternative. For example, if equally good technology was available
from an alternative seller who charges a $1.00 royalty to all takers, then the
disputed patent is probably not worth more than $1.00 either. Or if a patent
enables a firm to use $2.00 worth of a particular input rather than $2.30, and
makes no other contribution, then the license to the patent cannot be worth
more than the 30 cents cost savings. See Grain Processing Corp. v.
American Maize-Products, 185 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir 1999). Alternatively, if
the defendant could have "invented around" the patent at a fairly modest
cost, then the value that the patent adds to the infringer's product cannot be
more than that cost. Of course, in such cases the alternative may not be
"equally good," and then adjustments will have to be made. See Apple, Inc.
v. Motorola, Inc., 2012 WL 1959560 (N.D.Ill. May 22, 2012) (rejecting
such evidence when it came from interested parties, one of whom was not
competent to testify, but then also rejecting plaintiff's expert testimony for
failure to consider reasonably available alternatives).
See also
Spectralytics, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 649 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(rejecting cost of an available alternative as a royalty cap when the evidence
showed that the alternative had been tried and was found to be inferior).
4. In eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC 547 U.S. 388 (2006),
MercExchange held a patent designed to facilitate the sale of goods among
private individuals. MercExchange sought license its patent to eBay.
However, the parties failed to reach an agreement. Subsequently,
MercExchange filed an patent infringement case against eBay. At the
District Court, a jury found eBay had in fact infringed MercExchange’s
patent and awarded damages. As a remedy, MercExchange sought a
permanent injunction.
In determining whether MercExchange was entitled to
injunctive relief, the Supreme Court found that, as in courts of equity, a
plaintiff seeking permanent injunctive must satisfy a four-factor test and
demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that
remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to
compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships
between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted;
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and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent
injunction.
Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas held, “This approach is
consistent with our treatment of injunctions under the Copyright Act.
Like a patent owner, a copyright holder possesses the right to exclude
others from using his property. Like the Patent Act, the Copyright Act
provides that courts may grant injunctive relief on such terms as it may
deem reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright. And
as in our decision today, this Court has consistently rejected invitations
to replace traditional equitable considerations with a rule that an
injunction automatically follows a determination that a copyright has
been infringed.”
Since eBay, the overwhelming trend among the lower courts has been
to deny injunctions to non-practicing entities, sometimes referred to as
patent “trolls.” The Ricoh decision is a good example.
5. Should a patentee's remedy depend on its market share? In general,
dominant firms can more easily prove damages because they are able to
show that sales were taken from them. This is often not the case for a firm
in a highly competitive market, where sales could have come from
anywhere. Likewise, the "reasonable royalty" that a monopolist might
negotiate could be considerably higher than the one negotiated by one of
many patentees in the market for that particular innovation. Should a firm
with a very high market share should have a greater entitlement to an
injunction? If patent remedy rules tend to favor dominant firms, doesn't this
put patent law on a collision course with antitrust, which favors the
preservation of competition? If the purpose of antitrust remedies is to
promote competition, shouldn't the purpose of patent remedies be to spur
innovation?

